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Abstract
Securitization is a process that allows banks and other lenders to package loans and sell them
as bonds called asset-backed securities (ABS), removing them from their balance sheets and
immediately generating cash for new loans. ABS are an important component of the
financing cycle for many types of loans to households and small businesses, including
mortgages. In the fall of 2008, financial markets began experiencing disturbances as the
effects of the U.S. subprime market meltdown spread. The ABS market froze decreasing the
volume of new loans to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve became very
concerned about the potential for these circumstances to further weaken the U.S. economy
and, as a result, implemented the Term Asset-backed Loan Facility (TALF) to jumpstart the
market and mitigate the negative effects on the economy. In this case we discuss the design,
usage of the TALF, and its impact on the securitization markets during the crisis.

________________________________________________________________
This case study is one of five produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability case modules considering
the Federal Reserve’s credit and lending responses to the global financial crisis:
1

•
•
•
•
•

The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs for Depository
Institutions.
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs for Primary Dealers.
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars to Foreign Central Banks.
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response D: Commercial Paper Market Facilities.
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response D: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.

Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS),
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1. Introduction
By 2008, asset-backed securities (ABS) had become an important element in the funding
cycle for banks and other financial institutions providing a wide variety of loans to
businesses and households. The consequences of the ABS markets freezing included: limited
availability of credit to households and businesses of all sizes, an unprecedented widening
of interest rate spreads, sharply contracting liquidity in the capital markets, and the potential
to further weaken the U.S. economy. As a result, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) stepped in to
provide support to this critical market and implemented the Term Asset-backed Loan
Facility (TALF) in hopes of jumpstarting the market and mitigating the negative effects on
the economy.
This case discusses the design, usage, and impact of the TALF. The balance of this case is
organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the critical role of the ABS market in 2008; Section
3 describes the TALF in general, while Sections 4-6 discuss in more detail key provisions of
the TALF; lastly Section 7 analyzes the usage and impact of the TALF.
Questions
1. Why was the TALF designed to provide funding to investors who purchased ABS
rather than have the Fed purchase the ABS directly?
2. It took four months after the TALF was announced for the first subscription to occur.
What were some reasons for this delay?
3. Why were the categories of TALF-eligible collateral repeatedly expanded? Were the
different categories of collateral utilized as expected?
4. Early in the program, the Fed announced that it was willing to undertake a significant
expansion of the TALF from its original allocation of $200 billion to up to $1 trillion.
However, only $71 billion was ever lent under the TALF. What were some reasons for
the lower than expected levels of lending?
5. Given the extra capacity under the TALF, were there other asset classes that the Fed
should have considered approving?
6. Do you agree or disagree with the issues raised by the Congressional Oversight Panel
and with the points made by the Fed in response?
7. What does the TALF say about the Fed’s role as central banker in an economy that is
becoming less reliant on banks?

2.

Distress in the Asset Securitization Markets

By 2008 securitization had become an important and integral part of the financial system.
Traditionally, banks made loans to consumers and small businesses and maintained these
loans on their balance sheets until maturity. Beginning in the 1990s, however, there was a
steady increase in the incidence of selling these loans to third parties for cash that the banks
then used to fund new loans. This process of securitization also had the benefit that assets
could be removed from the balance sheet. Figure 1 diagrams a classic securitization process.
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Figure 1: The Securitization Process

Source: COP Report.

Many types of consumer debt (e.g., credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and mortgages)
and business loans (e.g., equipment and auto fleet leases) were treated in this manner. (See
Figure 2.) Over time, securitization via ABS became a significant and key element in the
business funding cycle for both banks and nonbanks, and many nonbanks, such as
manufacturers of autos and heavy equipment, became important players in the credit
markets assuming the lending function that had previously been performed by banks but
with the intent of packaging and selling these obligations as ABS. (See Figure 3.)
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Figure 2: U.S. Issuance of Securities Resulting from Securitization of Assets Other Than Real
Estate-related Loans, 1990-Q1 2009

Source: COP Report, 34. In addition, annual issuance of asset-backed securities resulting from the
securitization of mortgage and real estate related loans exceeded $2 trillion from 2002-07, before the
credit crunch took effect.

Figure 3: Net Credit Intermediation by U.S. Commercial Banks and Issuers of Asset-Backed
Securities (ABS)

Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.”

As the world savings glut expanded in the early 2000s investors sought out more safe assets,
leading financial institutions to become more innovative and sophisticated in providing such
assets. Because of the real estate and mortgage boom and the historical perception that U.S.
real estate was a solid, low-risk investment, mortgages on U.S. properties became an
increasing percentage of the securities underlying ABS. Growth of the subprime mortgage
industry in mid-2000s, much of it conducted by nonbank finance companies, also flowed
through to the ABS market.
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When the subprime mortgage market began to sour, ABS prices fell as investors became
concerned about all ABS, not just those composed of subprime mortgages. As the financial
crisis deepened, financial institutions fled any security perceived as risky and this severely
limited the sale of ABS. Institutions of all types, from banks to finance companies and
nonfinancial corporations that were in the business of originating loans with the intent to
securitize them, suddenly found themselves unable to sell such assets and were forced to
maintain them on their balance sheets. This led to a contraction in their funding cycle as
there was no new cash from selling ABS to support new loans. As a result, many institutions
tightened credit requirements. One survey considered by the Fed shortly before announcing
the TALF revealed that 60% of respondents had tightened lending standards on credit cards
and consumer loans and that the percentage that had tightened lending standards on
mortgages was even higher.5
In the years leading up to the crisis, approximately 25% of consumer debt was securitized.
Securitization was also an important element in funding loans to small businesses. By the fall
of 2008, the securitization markets for consumer and business ABS were severely
constricted, causing disruption in these markets and exacerbating the downturn in the
economy. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, which was
in part driven by concern over its commercial real estate holdings, sales of commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which were responsible for approximately 20% of
outstanding commercial real estate mortgages, came to a near complete halt (See Ashcraft et
al. 2012).
These developments were occurring as the interbank lending markets, notably commercial
paper and overnight repo, were also experiencing increasing rates, haircuts, and tightening
collateral demands, resulting in an overall contraction in liquidity. With the increasing
pressures on financial institutions, the Fed feared a rash of fire sales of “illiquid” securities
at depressed prices, which carried the additional risk of putting downward pressure on
balance sheets of institutions compelled to mark to market other assets held. It was these
concerns⎯that the crisis in the financial industry might spread to the real economy⎯that
prompted the Fed to address particular impaired markets, including the ABS market.

3. The Federal Reserve’s Response: The Term Asset-Backed Loan
Facility
The purpose of the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) was to jumpstart the market for
new ABS given its critical role in the credit cycle and thus to stimulate the overall economy.
The Fed relied on its emergency powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
(FRA) to loan to any person, partnership, or business in “exigent and unusual circumstances.”
(See Wiggins et al 2015, for a discussion of the Fed’s authority under FRA Section 13[3].) The
Fed described the situation and purpose when announcing the facility:
________________________________________________________________
“Moving to loans to households, almost 70 percent of respondents tightened standards on residential
mortgages to prime borrowers . . . nearly 90 percent of the institutions that originated nontraditional
mortgages tightened standards on such loans…. about 75 percent of the respondents tightened lending
standards on home equity lines of credit, and about 60 percent tightened standards on both credit cards … and
other consumer loans …. almost 25 percent of banks, on net, reported reducing the credit limits on existing
credit card accounts of some prime customers over the past three months, and about 60 percent of banks
reported cutting existing lines of some of their nonprime borrowers” (FOMC Trans. Oct. 28-29, 2008, 14).
5
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New issuance of ABS declined precipitously in September and came to a halt in
October. At the same time, interest rate spreads on AAA-rated tranches of ABS soared
to levels well outside the range of historical experience, reflecting unusually high risk
premiums. The ABS markets historically have funded a substantial share of consumer
credit and SBA-guaranteed small business loans. Continued disruption of these
markets could significantly limit the availability of credit to households and small
businesses and thereby contribute to further weakening of U.S. economic activity. The
TALF is designed to increase credit availability and support economic activity by
facilitating renewed issuance of consumer and small business ABS at more normal
interest rate spreads. (Fed. Res. PR Nov. 25, 2008)
Under the TALF, the Fed committed to provide up to $200 billion of one-year loans to
investors to purchase AAA-rated asset-backed securities (ABS) secured by newly and
recently originated auto loans, credit card loans, student loans, and loans guaranteed by the
Small Business Administration (SBA), but ABS backed by residential mortgages, such as
subprime, were not eligible. The loans were to be fully collateralized by the ABS with haircuts
applied and were to be non-recourse to the borrower. Originally funds were to be allocated
through monthly auctions of preannounced amounts via sealed auction bid but ultimately
the TALF operated as a standing facility lending at a rate set by the Fed. The loans were
announced to be for a one-year term, but upon launch in March 2009, however, the term had
been lengthened to three years. Later, a five-year loan would be added for certain collateral.
The TALF was the best of a small number of possible remedies considered by the Fed staff
for addressing the collapse of the ABS market (Ashcraft et al. 2012). Another option would
have been for the Fed to provide direct funding from the discount window to nonbank
finance companies, but this posed problems, including that the Fed had little experience in
evaluating nonbank companies. The Fed also could have purchased loans directly from the
issuers/originators, but again this carried risks and evaluation challenges that the Fed had
little experience with.6 By requiring the issuers to proceed with the securitization process,
the Fed relied on knowledgeable third parties whom the originators had to satisfy (investors
and rating agencies, for example) to review the ABS.
For several reasons the TALF was one of the more innovative facilities that the Fed
implemented during the crisis. Its focus was on a particular market, ABS, the originators of
which included banks, nonbanks, and nonfinancial companies, a wide variety of companies
that the Fed did not regularly deal with and which it had no authority to lend to in normal
circumstances.
ABS are long-term assets and thus, to be effective, the loans were lengthened beyond the
normal short-term maturities usually dealt with by the Fed. TALF assets would also enlarge
the Fed’s balance sheet for years if the Fed held the assets to loan maturity.
At the time, Chairman Bernanke noted that, “Relative to the Fed's short-term lending to
financial institutions, the CPFF and the TALF are rather unconventional programs for a
central bank to undertake. I see them as justified by the extraordinary circumstances in
which we find ourselves and by the need for central bank lending practices to reflect the
________________________________________________________________
It is instructive to compare the TALF’s design with that of two other Fed facilities used to combat the crisis:
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). Under the CPFF the Fed purchased eligible commercial paper directly from
issuers, albeit through a SPV. With the AMLF, the Fed lent money to depository institutions to purchase eligible
ABCP from eligible money market mutual funds, which ABCP the Fed used to secure the loans. (See Wiggins
and Metrick 2016D for analysis of and the CPFF and AMLF.)
6
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evolution of financial markets; after all, a few decades ago securitization markets barely
existed. Notably, other central banks around the world have shown increasing interest in
similar programs as they address the credit strains in their own countries. (Bernanke 2009)
Given some of the particular challenges posed by the TALF, it took the Fed four months after
announcement to work out the details and hold the first subscription. As noted above, in that
time several of the key terms were altered. (See Appendix A for a timeline of TALF dates.)
Also, on February 10, 2009, the Fed and the United States Department of the Treasury
(Treasury Department) jointly announced the expansion of the TALF up to a potential $1
trillion. However, as discussed below, utilization of the TALF would be limited, not even
reaching the original $200 billion. Yet, it would be heralded as an important tool in the Fed’s
arsenal against the financial crisis.

4. The Structure and Mechanics of the TALF
To implement the TALF, the Fed provided funds to the FRBNY to make loans to eligible
investors who would buy eligible ABS and, as the list of eligible collateral expanded, CMBS.
The loans were secured by the ABS and CMBS and were non-recourse to the borrower. Given
the widespread nature of securitization practice and the various types of assets that were
combined into ABS, the TALF permitted any U.S. company to borrow, as long as it met certain
eligibility criteria, and could deliver the eligible collateral to support the loan. Each borrower
was also required to establish an account with a TALF agent, usually a primary dealer, which
would evaluate the borrower for eligibility and also provide certain administrative functions
in the processing of the TALF loans. In this manner, because the Fed had limited experience
with evaluating non-depository institutions, it relied on some of its existing administrative
infrastructure in organizing the TALF.
The Fed would hold the TALF collateral until the loan maturity, three or five years, or until
otherwise paid off, at which time the collateral was redelivered to the borrower. Loans could
be prepaid and the collateral returned to the borrower. The borrower could also surrender
the collateral as pre-payment.
Although originally announced to be an auction facility, TALF was quickly changed to be a
standing facility with borrowers submitting subscriptions to buy at preannounced rates set
by the Fed. As shown in Figure 4, TALF made fixed-rate or floating-rate loans. For each
monthly subscription, the Fed established a fixed rate for each eligible collateral type, basis,
and loan maturity, setting it as a spread over an index. The level of the index, but not the
spread, varied by subscription month (Ashcraft et al. 2012).
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Figure 4: TALF Loan Rates
Collateral type

TALF Loan Rate

Fixed-rate asset-backed securities (ABS)
<One-year average life

One-year Libor Swap rate + 100 basis points (bps)

>=One-year average life

Two-year Libor swap rat + 100 bps

>=Two-year average life

Three-year Libor swap rate + 100 bps

SBA Development Company
participation certificates
Three-year TALF loan

Three-year Libor swap rate + 50 bps

Five-year TALF loan

Five-year Libor swap rate + 50 bps

Commercial mortgage-backed securities
Three-year TALF loan

Three-year Libor swap rate + 100 bps

Five-Year TALF loan

Five-year Libor swap rate + 100 bps

Floating-rate
Floating rate ABS

One-month Libor + 100 bps

FFELP loans

One-month Libor + 50 bps

SNA pool Certificates

Federal funds target + 75 bps

Private student loan

Max (100bps, prime rate - 175 bps)

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York: (Ashcraft et al. 2012).
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/12v18n3/1210ashc.pdf

In addition to the haircuts that were applied, an administrative fee of 10 basis points of the
loan amount was applied to loans secured by nonmortgage ABS and a fee of 20 basis points
was applied to TALF loans backed by CMBS collateral (Ashcraft et al., 2012).
Structurally, the TALF was one of the more complicated programs implemented by the Fed
and it required several parties to assess values of collateral, eligibility of borrowers, and to
manage the loans during their tenure. The FRBNY, the Fed entity responsible for managing
the TALF, employed other parties in the process:
•

TALF Agents—Primary dealers or other designated agents who handled
certain administrative activities between the FRBNY and the borrowers.
Agents paid TALF loan principal and interest from the proceeds of collateral
sales and paid the excess to the borrower.

•

Bank of New York Mellon—program custodian that held collateral and verified
pricing and rating for submitted collateral.
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•

Collateral monitors provided data and modeling services used in risk
assessments and also validated collateral pricing and ratings.

•

A special purpose vehicle (SPV), TALF LLC, was established in connection with
the TALF to hold any collateral surrendered by a borrower with respect to a
TALF loan. The FRBNY was the beneficiary of TALF LLC, and assets of the SPV
were consolidated onto its books. The SPV would in turn enter into loans with
eligible companies wishing to purchase eligible collateral that it held. The Fed
also loaned funds to TALF LLC for administrative costs. All such loans were
secured by the assets of TALF LLC.

COP Inquiry and Review
On March 29, 2009, Elizabeth Warren, who had recently been appointed to head the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP)7, sent a letter to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
questioning the impact on the Fed of acquiring these “illiquid” assets, the risks that it was
undertaking, the use of indirect investment vehicles, and other matters relating to the TALF
including reliance on the credit rating agencies to evaluate collateral. On April 1, 2009, the
Fed responded with a 13-page, single spaced letter: Fed COP Response. (Also see the related
Wall Street Journal article, Rappaport 2009B.)
In its May 2009 report evaluating the TALF, the COP identified several potential problems
with the TALF’s design and with market conditions that might damper the facility’s appeal
to its intended participants. These included:
•

Some investors were prohibited by regulation from borrowing to purchase
ABS.

•

Some traditional ABS investors were weak.

•

A mismatch of loan terms to the terms of collateral (at least originally).

•

Interest rates under TALF were unproven in the market. The cost of TALF
borrowings were greater than other Fed loan programs.

•

Uncertainty about the applicability of executive compensation and foreign
worker restrictions (originally proposed to apply then removed).

•

Confusion as to TALF Terms and Conditions.

•

Risk of political action.

(COP Report 2009).

________________________________________________________________
The Congressional Oversight Panel was created as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
and is charged with reviewing the state of the financial markets and regulatory system and submitting
regular reports to Congress. The panel was to issue regular reports to congress regarding “oversight of the
Treasury Secretary’s use of contracting authority program administration; the impact of TARP purchases on
financial markets and financial institutions; transparency; and the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation
efforts and whether the program has minimized long-term costs and maximized benefits to taxpayers”
(Warren 2009).
7
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The COP concluded that “the TALF cannot be the primary means to stimulate credit for small
business and family borrowing. Moreover, its shift of liability to the taxpayer remains an
important policy issue and requires that the TALF operate in a carefully monitored and fully
transparent way” (Ibid., 2009).
Media reports also indicated that some potential TALF investors and issuers “balked” at
certain TALF loan terms, such as one that was thought to give the Fed “too much power to
look at their books and to reject them from the program.” Discussions with market
participants may have also contributed to changes in some key terms of the TALF (Rappaport
2009A).

5. TALF Collateral
Over the course of its tenure there would be three categories of acceptable collateral under
the TALF, each with its own eligibility requirements: (1) Nonmortgage backed ABS, (2)
newly-issued CMBS, and (3) Legacy CMBS. See Figure 5 for summary details of the eligibility
requirements for each category.
Nonmortgage-backed ABS
At inception, in November 2008, the original collateral that was accepted under the TALF
was U.S.-dollar-denominated ABS that were secured by a variety of consumer and business
loans originated on or after January 1, 2009:
•

retail auto loans;

•

federally guaranteed and private student loans;

•

credit card receivables;

•

small-business loans, fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the U.S.
government, originated under the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s)
7(a) (“Pool Certificates”) and 504 (“Development Company Participation
Certificates”) programs.

(Fed. Res. PR Nov. 25, 2008; Ashcraft et al, 2012).
On March 19, 2008, the Fed held the first TALF auction and loaned $5.7 billion. On that day
it also announced that the TALF eligible collateral would expand to include ABS backed by
loans related to:
•

commercial, rental car company, and government fleet leases;

•

business equipment loans and leases;

•

floorplan loans, by which, for example, auto dealers finance inventories;

•

servicing advance receivables, which arise from residential mortgageservicing advances.

(Fed. Res. PR March 19, 2009).
On May 1, 2009, the Fed again expanded the categories of TALF eligible collateral to include
securities backed by:

153

The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response E

•

Wiggins and Metrick

insurance premium finance loans, by which businesses finance lump-sum
insurance premium payments.

(Fed. Res. PR May 1, 2009).
Figure 5: Overview of TALF-Eligible Collateral

aAsset-backed

securities (ABS) must have an average life of five years or less.

bMust

refinance maturing ABS through 2010:Q1 or be new master trust with originations after January
1, 2009. Eligible premium finance ABS may also be issued out of an existing or newly established master
trust in which all or substantially all of the underlying exposures were originated on or after January 1,
2009.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Requirements
Eligible ABS had to have a credit rating in the highest investment-grade rating category
(AAA) from two or more approved major rating agencies8, and could not have received a
credit rating below the highest investment grade rating category from a major rating agency
________________________________________________________________
Only ratings from Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service, or Standard & Poor’s were acceptable. After
criticism from the COP, the Fed expanded the number of acceptable rating agencies for CMBS adding Realpoint
and DBRS and also adopted a rule as to how it would qualify agencies. Also see discussion at page 16.
8
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(PR Nov. 25, 2008). The rating had to be attained on the strength of the securitized assets
and structure and not because of a financial guarantee or “wrap” provided by an insurance
company (Ashcraft et al. 2012). At least ninety-five percent of the credit exposures
underlying the eligible collateral had to be incurred by U.S. obligors.
The original list of collateral was narrowly drawn and significantly, excluded previously
issued ABS as the intent was to stimulate new lending. Synthetic ABS were also excluded
because some of these more highly-structured bonds had been shown to have obscured the
risks associated with the underlying assets. Also excluded was ABS that contained
underlying assets that the issuer had originated.
TALF borrowers were not required to post additional collateral if the value of their posted
collateral declined during the term of the loan. And substitutions of collateral were not
permitted.
As shown in Figure 6, TALF loans secured by nonmortgage ABS would amount to $59 billion
(out of a total of $71 billion), the overwhelming majority of loans issued under the facility.
The last TALF auction was held in March 2010.
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Figure 6: TALF Loans by Subscription and Asset Class (Millions of Dollars, Except as Noted)

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. (Ashcraft et al. 2012).

Expansion of the TALF Commitment
On February 10, even before the first auction was held, the Fed and Treasury Department
jointly announced a willingness to commit as much as $1 trillion to the TALF program and
to expand the acceptable categories of collateral. The expansion was supported by additional
funds from the Treasury Department pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(approved in October 2008). The expanded TALF was incorporated as a key element of The
Consumer and Business Lending Initiative, a “multipronged effort to unlock credit markets
in the U.S. economy” adopted by the Treasury Department. (See Treasury 2009.) Specifically,
the TALF was to “provide additional assistance to financial markets and institutions in
meeting the credit needs of households and businesses and thus to support overall economic
growth in the current period of severe financial strains” (Fed. Res. PR Feb. 10, 2009).
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At the original announcement of the TALF, the Fed also indicated that it might later expand
eligible asset classes to include commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), non-Agency
residential mortgage-backed securities, or other asset classes (Fed. Res. PR Nov. 25, 2008).
A TALF white paper issued by the Treasury Department (March 3, 2009) revealed that
several other classes of assets were indeed being analyzed and evaluated whether and how
they might be added to the TALF. The focus was on “including securities that will have the
greatest macroeconomic impact and that could most efficiently be added to the TALF at a
low and manageable risk to the government” (Treasury 2009).
The asset classes that ultimately were added to the TALF are discussed below. Also
considered but not added to TALF eligible collateral were private label residential mortgage
backed securities, collateralized loan and debt obligations, and other ABS not included in the
initial rollout (Ibid.).
Newly-issued CMBS
On May 1, 2009, the Fed further expanded the TALF-eligible collateral to include newlyissued CMBS; the first subscription was to occur in June. At the same time the Fed also
authorized five-year loans (up to $100 billion) to purchase newly-issued CMBS, and ABS
backed by student loans and by SBA loans. Extension to the five-year term brought TALF
loan maturities closer to the longer average maturities of these types of securities.
Eligible CMBS had to be privately issued, structurally senior AAA-rated tranches secured by
first-lien, fixed-rate amortizing commercial real estate loans originated on or after January
1, 2009, that bore a fixed interest rate (Ashcraft et al. 2012). Like nonmortgage ABS, the
rating had to be attained on the strength of the securitization collateral and the structure
itself and could not rely on a financial guarantee or “wrap” provided by an insurance
company or third party (Ibid., 44).
The first subscription of the new-issue CMBS program was offered in June 2009 and the last
in June 2010. The demand for this type of borrowing never materialized, and only one TALFeligible newly-issued CMBS subscription was closed, in November 2009 for $72.2 million.
Since the purchase price factored into the determination of the loan amount, borrowers had
to have purchased the legacy CMBS in recent secondary-market transactions between
unaffiliated parties, executed on an arm’s-length basis at prevailing market prices. The
FRBNY would independently review and reject any CMBS that did not meet the stated
criteria or which otherwise posed “unacceptable risk” (Fed. Res. PR May 19, 2009).
The objective of the expansion to include legacy CMBS was to restart the market for legacy
securities and, by doing so, stimulate the extension of new credit by helping to ease balance
sheet pressures on banks and other financial institutions. It was postulated that by
“promot[ing] price discovery and liquidity of legacy CMBS” the improvement in the market
would “facilitate the issuance of new-issue CMBS, thereby helping borrowers finance new
purchases of commercial properties or refinance existing commercial mortgages on better
terms” (Ibid.).
Expanding the TALF to include legacy CMBS was controversial at the Fed. Transcripts show
that several members balked at taking on what many in the market considered “a
euphemism for asset-backed instruments created during the boom that had become toxic”
and felt that “Funding the bad bank is a close cousin to being the bad bank” (Morgenson
2015). However, the Fed staff considered that stimulating a market for such securities would
propel their prices and help bolster bank balance sheets (Ibid.).
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On August 17, 2009, the Fed announced that it was holding in abeyance any further
expansion of collateral types, and no further expansion of the TALF-eligible collateral types
occurred.
Legacy CMBS proved fairly attractive as collateral and as shown in Figure 6, loans secured
by legacy CMBS became a sizeable amount of TALF landings, totaling $12 billion of the $71
billion total lent under the program. The last legacy CMBS subscription was held March 2010.

6. Features of the TALF Designed to Minimize Risk
From its origination there was controversy that the TALF required the Fed to acquire and
hold securities of broader types than the high-quality collateral that it usually accepted at its
discount window and Open market operations. The TALF assets also had maturities of longer
duration than usually held by the Fed. TALF loans were collateralized but were issued on a
non-recourse basis. If a borrower failed to repay the loan, the Fed would retain the collateral,
but if it was insufficient to cover the amounts owed, the Fed had no recourse to the borrower.
In designing the TALF, the Fed incorporated a number of features designed to mitigate these
risks.
Haircuts
All TALF collateral was subject to a haircut, which is a type of risk-sharing because the lender
does not receive the full-benefit of the market value of the collateral. By applying a haircut,
the Fed had a cushion to protect itself if the borrower defaults or if the collateral decreases
in value. Haircuts were applied to all collateral securing the TALF loans and ranged from 5%
to 16% based on the quality of the assets. Examples include:
•

A 5% haircut was applied to student loans and SBA loans guaranteed by the
government with maturities of 1-5 years.

•

A haircut of 9% was applied to subprime auto loans with one-year maturity.
For similar loans with a four-to-five-year maturity, a 13% haircut applied.

•

For all CMBS with maturities of five years or less, a 15% haircut applied.

See Appendix C for a detailed listing of TALF haircuts.
In responding to the COP’s inquiry, the Fed stated that the haircuts were risk-based, that it
had “chosen the haircuts to exceed the losses in value likely in nearly all future outcomes,”
and that “[in] recognition of the fact that the current economic situation is extraordinary and
the outlook is especially uncertain, our economists made very conservative assumptions in
calibrating the program’s haircuts” (Fed COP Response 2009).
Treasury Underwriting
From origination until January 15, 2013, the Treasury Department committed $20 billion in
backup funding from the TARP, to the TALF LLC providing credit protection to the FRBNY. If
a TALF loan was not repaid and the proceeds could not be recouped through sale of the
collateral, the Treasury Department would bear the next losses, after the borrower’s haircut,
up to $20 billion, beyond which the Federal Reserve would bear any further losses (Ashcraft
et al. 2012).
In July 2010, when the program was closed to new lending, the Treasury Department’s
commitment was reduced to $4.3 billion to reflect the fact that only $43 billion of TALF loans
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were outstanding. After January 15, 2013, the TALF LLC became self-funding through the
income and appreciation for the securities held, and the Treasury back-up funding was no
longer needed.
Required Credit Ratings
All TALF collateral had to have the highest rating, AAA (or the equivalent), from two
designated nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) and could not be
rated less by any such agency. Originally Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, or
Fitch Ratings were the acceptable NRSROs for nonmortgage ABS. For newly-issued CMBS,
eligible NRSROs also included Realpoint and DBRS (Fed. Res. PR May 19, 2009). The rating
could not be achieved through the reliance on a financial guarantee from a third party or a
“wrap” from an insurance company but had to be attained on the strength of the security’s
underlying assets and structure.
The credibility of rating agencies had come under attack as the subprime mortgages and
related securities were downgraded. The issue of the reliability of the ratings was also raised
in the COP’s Letter.9 As a result, on October 5, 2009, the Fed proposed a new rule creating a
new process for determining NRSROs that were acceptable to rate TALF collateral (Fed. Res.
PR Oct. 5, 2009). The rule was adopted on December 4, 2009, and required NRSROs to
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and demonstrate experience in
issuing credit ratings specific to the types of assets accepted as collateral under the TALF
(Fed. Res. PR Dec. 4, 2009). With the February 2010 subscription, DBRS became an eligible
rating agency for nonmortgage ABS (Ashcraft et al. 2012).
Independent Auditor Verification
Each ABS issuer of TALF collateral also had to have an external auditor provide an opinion
that management’s assertions concerning key collateral eligibility requirements were fairly
stated in material respects. The Fed asserted that this “attestation provide[ed] a high level
of assurance concerning TALF collateral eligibility requirements” (Fed COP Response).
Internal Risk Assessment
When the Fed announced that it would begin accepting CMBS as eligible TALF collateral it
also stated that it would begin conducting internal risk assessments of all such assets
delivered. This assessment was likely driven by the unreliable history of certain mortgagerelated securities and presumably would provide the basis for the Fed exercising its right to
reject any CMBS, or individual underlying loans, as not meeting eligibility requirements or
as presenting an “unacceptable risk” (Fed. Res. PR May 19, 2009).
The risk assessments for CMBS were more intensive than those of nonmortgage ABS but both
relied on the issuers providing all data regarding the ABS or CMBS and the underlying
exposures that had been provided to any NRSRO well in advance of the TALF subscription
date for which the collateral was proposed to be used. For CMBS the Fed analyzed not just
the underlying asset pool and trust structure, but also key documents (Ashcraft et al. 2012).

________________________________________________________________
9 “Consistent failures of the credit rating agencies were a significant factor in the sales of risky mortgage-backed

securities that helped produce the current financial crisis. In light of these failures, please explain why reliance
on credit ratings for the TALF is a reasonable basis on which to protect the taxpayers, regardless of the number
of credit-ratings agencies whose opinions are required” (Fed COP Response, Item 8.)
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Beginning with the November 2009 subscription, the FRBNY also conducted a formal risk
assessment with respect to nonmortgage ABS collateral delivered for TALF loans. This
assessment was designed to ensure that bonds pledged to TALF met three general standards:
1. Credit quality: The bond is of the highest credit quality with de minimis risk of
default and a low probability of a material deterioration in credit quality.
2. Transparency: Sufficient information is available to allow investors to make
informed judgments about the credit risk of the collateral underlying the bond as
well as the level of due diligence on the collateral performed by the issuer.
3. Simplicity of structure: The relationship between the performance of the
underlying collateral and bond payments is clear and uncomplicated (Fed. Res. PR
Oct. 5, 2009). (Also see Appendix B.)

7. Usage and Impact of the TALF
In aggregate, the Fed issued 2,152 loans, totally $71.1 billion, under the TALF. The volume of
outstanding loans peaked in March 2010 at $48.2 billion. The one subscription against
newly-issued CMBS occurred in March 2009 for $ 72.2 million. Loans secured by
nonmortgage ABS totaled $59 billion and loans secured by legacy CMBS totaled $12 billion
(Ashcraft et al. 2012, 57).
TALF usage grew gradually as shown in Figure 6. Despite supposed pent-up volume, only
$4.7 billion was subscribed to in the first lending in March 2009. This was followed by totals
of $1.7 billion, $10.9 billion, and $11.5 billion in April, May, and June respectively. The Fed
termed the trend a “sign of sustained interest after a slow start” (Lanman and Mulholland
2009).
Utilization was sustained and even increased as TALF-eligible asset classes were expanded.
However, overall, utilization of the TALF would stall well below the intended levels of the
Fed and Treasury; the aggregate of loans did not even reach one half of the originally
committed $200 billion. Ashcraft concludes that the low level of usage of the TALF can be
attributed to two things (1) the stringent risk mitigators built into the facility to protect the
public and (2) the rapid improvement in market conditions for the ABS and CMBS markets
(Ashcraft et al. 2012). As discussed above, however, the COP and various investors and
issuers also felt that certain design elements of the TALF, and market factors, were not
particularly conducive to robust utilization of the facility.
The original expiration date for the TALF, December 31, 2009, was extended to March 31,
2010, for loans against ABS and legacy CMBS, and until June 30, 2010, for loans against
newly-issued CMBS. The last outstanding TALF loan matured on October 29, 2014. TALF LLC
was terminated on November 2014 after distributing accumulated fees and income to the
Treasury (90%) and FRBNY (10%).
Impact of the TALF on the Securitization Markets
Despite the lower than expected subscription levels and low volume of usage, the TALF has
been credited with succeeding in its objective of providing liquidity to the securitization
market and helping it to restart. As early as June 2009, the Fed reported that the program
was “working as designed” and that there were signs that the issuance of consumer ABS
securities “has been gradually reviving.” March saw four deals totaling $8.3 billion come to
market, followed by four in April ($2.9 billion) and eight in May ($13.6 billion). And in June,
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13 deals worth $16.4 billion closed. These numbers were a long way from the $200 billion
per year in new issuances experienced in recent years but were seen as a “good start,”
especially because TALF-eligible deals accounted for only about half of the new issuances.
“This means that the TALF is helping to restart the market rather than the TALF being the
market” (Dudley 2009).
In November 2009, it was reported that a total of $134 billion in new ABS had been issued
during the year and that two-thirds of them had been assisted with TALF loans (Shrivastava
2009). Perhaps, more importantly, there were already implications in the market that the
ABS market had “sufficiently recovered from last year’s credit crisis that issuer and investors
again could interact directly with one another” (Ibid.). (Also see Figure 7 for changes in the
ABS secondary Market Spreads.)
By March 2010, the TALF was being termed “[O]ne of the Federal Reserve’s most successful
financial rescue programs” and being praised for having “worked so well” (Ellis 2010). The
program was said to “have done what it was supposed to: rekindle demand and get credit
flowing again” (Shrivastava 2010). That month more than $21 billion in ABS supported by
student, auto, and credit card loans were issued, two-thirds without the support of the TALF.
Moreover, Tom Deutsch, Executive Director of the American Securitization Forum
commented that there seemed to be evidence of a “pretty significant shift from TALF-eligible
deals to non-TALF, which is a pretty strong signal that the market has returned to near
normal levels” (Ellis 2010).
This was exactly the type of trend that the Fed had hoped the TALF would spark. In May 2010
the Fed reported favorably on the TALF’s impact on the ABS markets:
Nonetheless, market reactions to the announcement of the emergency facilities,
anecdotal evidence, and a number of the studies we do have suggest that the facilities
forestalled potentially much worse outcomes and encouraged improvements. For
example, some asset-backed securities (ABS) spreads, such as those for consumer
ABS and commercial mortgage-backed securities, narrowed significantly following
the creation of the TALF, and activity in ABS markets has picked up. While the overall
improvement in the economic outlook has no doubt contributed to the improvement
in ABS markets, it does appear that the TALF helped to buoy the availability of credit
to firms and households and thus supported economic activity. Indeed, following the
kick-start from the TALF, a number of these markets are now operating without any
governmental backing. (Kohn 2010)
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Figure 7: Consumer ABS Secondary Market Spreads Have Narrowed from Their Historically
High Levels Reached in the Fourth Quarter of 2008

Source: COP Report, 47.

As might be expected, after announcement, spreads improved for classes of assets eligible
for TALF funding. However, researchers also found that shortly thereafter, spreads also
improved for non-eligible classes of assets.
It is also interesting to note that the Fed has favorably characterized the TALF as an
important, new and necessary type of liquidity response for it in its central banker role. It
justified its support for market-based credit intermediation, as opposed to traditional
banking sector support, by citing the key and sizeable role that securitization had come to
play in the economy. While recognizing that legislative changes might limit its ability to
implement another TALF, the Fed expressed commitment to the idea that “[it] should be
flexible in setting the structure of its liquidity programs to meet the needs of the market”
(Sack 2010).
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APPENDIX A: Events in the TALF Program
Date

Event

November 25, 2008

Initial Program Announcement

March 19, 2009

First new-issue asset-backed security (ABS) subscription

March 19, 2009

Expansion to equipment, servicing advance, fleet lease, nonauto floorplan

March 19, 2009

Joint U.S. Treasury/Federal reserve announcement of expansion of TALF to up to
$1 trillion and plans to study inclusion of legacy commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) and residential mortgage-backed securities

May 1, 2009

Expansion to new-issue CMBS and insurance premium receivables

May 1, 2009

Announcement of the five-year TALF loans, carry cap

May 16, 2009

First new-issue CMBS subscription

May 19, 2009

Expansion to legacy CMBS

July 16, 2009

First legacy CMBS subscription

November 3, 2009

First ABS subscription applying Fed Credit risk assessment

November 17, 2009

First TALF-eligible new-issue CMBS deal

March 4, 2010

Last ABS subscription date

March 19, 2010

Last legacy CMBS subscription date

June 18, 2010

Last new-issue CMBS subscription date

July 20, 2010

Reduction of TARP capital in TALF LLC

Source:
Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
http.//www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_announcements.html.
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APPENDIX B: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Risk Assessment Principles for
Nonmortgage-Backed ABS
The purpose of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s risk assessment process is
to ensure that bonds pledged to TALF meet three general standards.
1. Credit quality: The bond is of the highest credit quality with de minimis risk of
default and a low probability of a material deterioration in credit quality.
2. Transparency: Sufficient information is available to allow investors to make
informed judgments about the credit risk of the collateral underlying the bond as
well as the level of due diligence on the collateral performed by the issuer.
3. Simplicity of structure: The relationship between the performance of the
underlying collateral and bond payments is clear and uncomplicated.
In determining whether a proposed transaction satisfies each of the principles
above, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recognizes that appropriate
structural and transactional features may differ significantly across asset
categories. Within an asset category, however, bonds will be reviewed relative to
generally accepted prudent market practices in the areas of credit support; issuer
and servicer strength; underwriting; diversification (geographic, borrower, or
other); and simplicity of structure.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York will identify transactions that may not meet
these standards and, in as timely a manner as possible, alert the issuer of specific
concerns.
Source: Fed. Res. PR October 5, 2009.
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Appendix C: Collateral Haircuts for Nonmortgage-Backed ABS Collateral Under TALF
ABS Average Life (years)
Sector

Subsector

0-<1

1-<2

2-<3

3-<4

4-<5

Auto

Prime retail lease

10%

11%

12%

13%

14%

Auto

Prime retail loan

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

Auto

Subprime retail loan

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

Auto

Motorcycle/

7%

8%

9%

10%

11%

5-<6

6-<7

other recreational vehicles
Auto

Commercial and government fleets

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

Auto

Rental fleets

12%

13%

14%

15%

16%

Credit Card

Prime

5%

5%

6%

7%

8%

Credit Card

Subprime

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

Equipment

Loans and Leases

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

Floorplan

Auto

12%

13%

14%

15%

16%

Floorplan

Non-Auto

11%

12%

13%

14%

15%

Premium Finance

Property and casualty

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

Servicing Advances

Residential mortgages

12%

13%

14%

15%

16%

Small Business

SBA Loans

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

6%

6%

Student Loan

Private

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

14%

Student Loan

Gov’t guaranteed

5%

5%

5%

5%

5%

6%

6%

Notes: For ABS benefitting from a substantial government guarantee with average lives of five years and beyond, haircuts will
increase by one percentage point for every two additional years (or portion thereof) of average life at or beyond five years. For
all other ABS with average lives of five years and beyond, haircuts will increase by one percentage point for each additional year
(or
portion
thereof)
of
average
life
at
or
beyond
five
years.
The collateral haircut for each newly issued CMBS with an average life of five years or less will be 15%. For newly issued CMBS
with average lives beyond five years, collateral haircuts will increase by one percentage point for each additional year (or portion
thereof) of average life beyond five years. No CMBS may have an average life beyond ten years.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York: http://www.newyorkfed.org//markets/talf_faq.html#10
(Ashcraft et al. 2012).
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